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Interventions are increasingly being designed to disrupt ongoing criminal activity rather than 
identify crimes that have already been committed (Innes & Sheptycki, 2004). The emerging 
emphasis on disrupting organised criminal groups can be contrasted with older enforcement 
led approaches, which were resource intensive and limited in their success (Kirby & Nailer, 
2013). Rational choice theory (Cornish & Clarke, 1986) assumes that individuals adopt a 
rational perspective when engaging in illicit activity and can therefore be diverted away if the 
cost of doing so outweighs the benefits. This holds some premise for the disruption of organised 
criminal groups, providing that the complexities of this phenomena are better understood. 
Organised criminal networks are heterogenous and operate at varying levels (Kirby & Nailer, 
2013), engage with other known associates and diversify into different types of crime (Galeotti, 
2005); making assessment of their strategies problematic. There is a common understanding, 
nevertheless, that criminal groups are ultimately driven by profit with violence, intimidation 
and coercion administered to further their criminal purpose and obstruct the policing response 
to them (Dean, Fahsing & Gottschalk, 2010; Stelfox, 1996). Yet, it is this behaviour that makes 
members of organised criminal groups visible and susceptible to intervention, thereby making 
disruption viable.  
The chapter will expand on this approach, defining organised crime before identifying 
a number of multi-agency strategies adopted to tackle behaviours, such as violence, often 
thought to be a vessel for maximising criminal entrepreneurship. There will be a focus on 
organised crime manifesting in the United Kingdom (UK), solely making reference to other 
countries for comparison purposes. 
 
Defining organised crime 
Organised crime has received considerable attention in recent years as Governments 
have become increasingly aware of its scope, costs and dangers. Indeed, ‘organised crime’ as 
a phenomenon has been integrated into the vocabulary of politicians and the wider public, yet 
there remains no agreed reference point for which it can be defined while satisfying all parties 
(Woodiwiss & Hobbs, 2009). Definitions vary according to their sources, and although 
politicians and law enforcement are likely to delineate organised crime in a manner that is 
conducive to their operations and risk management, social scientists prefer a deeper, more 
theoretical basis for their analysis (Wright, 2006). The focus of the term appears to depend on 
 2 
who is defining it and for what means (Sergi, 2016). Thus, achieving a unified definition of 
organised crime may, at present, prove challenging, and instead a review of the reoccurring 
themes within existing definitions is recommended. 
The term ‘organised crime’ has readily been applied, albeit subjectively, to a certain 
type of more sophisticated, complex set of criminal activities embedded within a network of 
illicit markets. Activities are known to involve a plethora of financially-rewarding crimes, 
including firearms, drugs, child sexual exploitation (CSE), modern slavery and human 
trafficking, which are often ‘enabled’ through violence, corruption and intimidation (Albanese, 
2008; Hauck & Peterke, 2010; Wright, 2006). However, restricting the definition of organised 
crime to a simple list of serious illegal activities does not provide any meaningful information 
on the ‘organised’ element of the crime, or the characteristics of the group that are initiating 
these activities. Such a view essentially depicts organised crime as an indicator of criminality, 
which is problematic as organised crime is heterogenous, dependent on context, persons 
involved, and the market within which it subscribes to; activities are therefore likely to vary 
across groups. Engagement in such activities does not automatically indicate involvement in 
organised criminality (Hauck & Peterke, 2010), and ignoring this would make organised crime 
impossible to measure, let alone respond to (Crocker, Webb, Garner, Skidmore, Gill & 
Graham, 2017).  
Organised crime has also been conceptualised through the defining characteristics of 
the organisations themselves (Hagan, 2006), with groups falling into either a hierarchical or 
enterprise model. It is the former that has been associated with organisations, such as the Italian 
Mafia and Mexican drug cartels (Paoli, 2006), and recognised in Finckenauer’s (2005) 
approach to organised crime. He listed eight analytic defining variables of organised crime, 
which included “lack of ideology, structure/organised hierarchy, continuity, violence/use of 
force or use of threat, restricted membership, illegal enterprises, penetration of legitimate 
businesses and corruption” (Longo, 2010, p. 17). According to Longo (2010), it is the 
hierarchical structure and continuity of the organisation that gives organised crime its collective 
identity. If specific individuals leave, or indeed are detained by law enforcement, they are 
simply replaced by others. This therefore enables organisations to continue and adapt to 
changes in the external environment, thus making disruption problematic. Organised 
criminality, much like legitimate businesses, have distinct enterprises such as those handling 
recruitment, cash flow, communications and the management of people (Wright, 2013). Law 
enforcement activity can fail where interventions only focus on specific elements of the 
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enterprise, or seek to detain only ‘high profile’ members without a focus on their wider 
business, recovery of criminally gained assets, and removal of money laundering capability.  
The use of force, violence and intimidation have been considered as strategies to gain 
power and control territory, and have readily been associated with hierarchical organisations, 
such as the Italian Mafia. These strategies have been viewed as ‘anti-state’ activity that threaten 
national institutions, and as such, have been coined a political concern (Longo, 2010). Whilst 
some scholars believe that a hierarchical structure is necessary to exercise this ‘anti-state’ 
activity, others have suggested that a centralised structure is suffice, providing that any 
violence, as a form of territorial control, occurs solely at a sub-national level to avoid direct 
conflict with the state (e.g. Catanzaro, 1993, as cited in Longo, 2010).  
Arguably, there has been an evolution in organised crime, with a shift from traditional 
definitions relating to structure towards ‘entrepreneurial crime’, which focuses on a financial 
or economic objective. Traditional forms of organised crime predominantly utilised power to 
protect specific interests whereas entrepreneurial crime is said to have transformed itself into 
the national economy, accumulating profit through the production of services and goods, and 
using violence and intimidation more so to sustain competitive advantage (Dean et al., 2010; 
Longo, 2010). Smith (1975) conceptualised entrepreneurial crime as a response to a latent illicit 
demand that extended beyond the legal market. However, Paoli (2002) rejected this, claiming 
that definitions of organised crime cannot be narrowed down to the provision of illegal goods 
and services. She argued that illicit market dynamics were often unorganised, lacking rules, 
security and controls, and were therefore not conducive to organised crime. Instead, Paoli 
(2002) referred back to the traditional viewpoint, stating that there is more to organised crime 
than the illegal entrepreneurial activities, making reference to several non-economic roles, such 
as protection and the supplying of votes.  
The enterprise model, nevertheless, was proposed in response to an increase in the 
effect of organised crime on member states of the European Union (EU, 1998; Smith, 1980). 
As such, a joint report of the European Commission and Europol was published in 2001 
outlining a working definition of organised crime (Wright, 2006). This demarcates organised 
crime through eleven characteristics (Elvins, 2003, p. 34): “1). Collaboration of more than two 
people; 2). Each with own appointed tasks; 3). For a prolonged or indefinite period of time; 
4). Using some form of discipline or control; 5). Suspected of the commission of serious 
criminal offences; 6). Operating at an international level; 7). Using violence or other means for 
intimidation; 8). Using commercial or business-like structures; 9) Engaged in money 
laundering; 10). Exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, judicial 
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authorities or the economy; and 11). Determined by the pursuit of profit and/or power”. Of 
these characteristics, six have to be identified, with the four in italics needing to be among the 
six for a case to be viewed as organised crime. 
These characteristics place significant emphasis on the formation of structured links to 
allow for a range of criminal acts or exploitation that generate profit. Article 2 of the United 
Nations (UN) Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, 2004, p. 5) supported this view and defined an organised criminal group as: 
“A structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert 
with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences… in order to obtain, directly 
or indirectly, a financial or material benefit”. Thus, there are similarities between the EU and 
UN definitions of organised criminal groups, with organisational structure depicted as an 
important concept. This is not to say, however, that organisations adopt the same characteristics 
or structures, rather there are more subtle, implicit differences across groups that relate to 
function, and this facilitates a range of organised criminal activity.  
Although organisational structure has long been associated with more traditional forms 
of organised crime, its importance seems to have extended to entrepreneurial crime, suggesting 
that the hierarchical and enterprise models are less distinct than initially thought. Adopting a 
social network analytical approach offers further insight into the structural systems 
underpinning organised criminal groups, and according to Mcillwain (1999), such 
organisations are underpinned by a social system comprising a multiplex set of relationships 
among individuals (and with other groups) whose overall aim is to provide illicit goods and 
services. These connections are stated to be fluid and interdependent, largely influenced by the 
context in which the organised criminal activity takes place (Longo, 2010). The provision of 
services by organised crime groups should not be underestimated as many current forms 
involve human trafficking as a key element to service the sex, agricultural, drug production, 
domestic and beauty demands of western cultures(Aronowitz, 2001; FitzGerald, 2012).  
 It becomes apparent that there is little consensus on the meaning of the term ‘organised 
crime’. Whilst conceptualisations share common features, there are also differences, and it is 
arguably these differences that further convey organised crime as a heterogenous construct. 
Definitions of organised crime should not be abandoned, rather they are to be viewed as a 
foundation for continual dialogue between academics and practitioners where theoretical 
understandings can be merged with worked experience. It is this relationship that will aid the 
generation of vital knowledge aimed at improving the effectiveness of counter-organised crime 
policies, and the consequent disruption of organised criminal groups (Longo, 2010).  
 5 
 However, there are notable limitations with the aforementioned definitions in that 
organised crime has been conceptualised in such a manner to facilitate both law-enforcement 
and political interest, and as such, there are theoretical features or characteristics that have 
likely been omitted. Definitions, such as the enterprise model, provide a focus for the policing 
of organised crime so as to avoid an ineffective use of resources. The inclusion of illicit 
activities, whilst fitting with modern criminal law (i.e. individuals are punished for what they 
do, not what they belong to), also supports the detection of organised crime, which only tends 
to become apparent during further investigation (Hauck & Peterke, 2010). Attending to illicit 
activities, such as violence, somewhat increases the visibility of organised criminal networks 
and may prove to be one method of identifying and deterring such groups. Yet, this method of 
detection is by no means straightforward and challenges remain, which are highlighted in the 
ensuing section.  
 
Organised crime and gang violence  
 The National Crime Agency (NCA), formally known as the Serious Organised Crime 
Agency (SOCA) until October 2013, is responsible for tackling organised crime at a national 
and international level in England and Wales. Their policing model is mostly consistent with 
the enterprise model and views organised crime as a set of varying illicit activities committed 
by a group. The emphasis on criminal activities as a defining feature distinguishes organised 
crime in England and Wales from that occurring in other countries, such as Italy, which Sergi 
(2015) associates more with the hierarchical (structural) model. There are also deviations from 
the enterprise model, albeit to a lesser extent, in that organised crime in England and Wales is 
linked to gang-related activity, such as violence (Hobbs, 2013), which on the surface does not 
necessary fit with the model’s entrepreneurial focus. The English conceptualisation of 
organised crime as local gang-style enterprises has thus been disputed (e.g. Klein, Maxson & 
Cunningham, 1991). However, there is now general acceptance that it is the ‘seriousness’ of 
the criminal activity that differentiates local gangs from established organised criminal groups, 
with the latter associated more with increased bouts of severe activity (Home Office, 2014), 
which, unsurprisingly, is likely to result in disproportionate harm (Kirby, Francis, Humphreys 
& Soothill, 2016). Both groups, nevertheless, are reported to be rooted in their local territories 
and linked to drugs and violence manifesting at street-level (Sergi, 2015). 
 As such, violence, intimidation and coercion have readily been associated with both 
street gangs and organised criminal groups (e.g. Decker & Curry, 2000; Ratcliffe, 2016). 
Reference to violence in this instance, however, does not involve that which manifests on an 
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individual basis for personal gain, rather it relates to violence occurring in the context of 
membership specific to the gang or organised criminal group. There is much debate as to 
whether street gangs evolve into criminal business organisations, with scholars proposing that 
gangs may form, but not necessarily reach the highest developmental stage and commit more 
serious offences for profit (Densley & Harding, 2018; Pitts, 2019). It is at the highest level 
where gangs are said to shift from the recreational and criminal stages to financial goal 
orientation. Yet, this mutation is likely to be determined by the opportunities available, pre-
existing forms of criminality in the area, gang member attributes and local enforcement (Pitts, 
2019). In areas of weaker local enforcement, with criminality unfamiliar to the Policing control 
there are distinct opportunities for organised criminality; for example, the current trajectory of 
county lines drug supply chains and cuckooing. In these instances, law enforcement has to learn 
of the criminality, its context and boundaries, and then respond. This can be time consuming. 
Evolutionary trajectories may therefore differ across gangs, resulting in varying levels of 
organisation and commitment to instrumental goals.  
 Regardless of level or sophistication, violence, intimidation and coercion are prevalent 
in gang life. Wright (2006), however, makes a distinction between tactical and strategic forms 
of violence, noting the latter to be utilised both directly and indirectly by well-established crime 
groups. Strategic violence is adopted to fulfil longer-term goals, which may directly relate to 
growth, survival, and the need to protect the organisation from competitors or law-enforcement. 
This may also occur indirectly, for example, where adults belonging to an established organised 
crime group mentor younger members through the business-like restructuring of street gangs, 
thus resulting in entrepreneurial expansion to rural and coastal areas; formally known as county 
lines (Hesketh & Robinson, 2019). The emergence of county lines over the past six years has 
resulted in a dramatic rise in violence, specifically knife crime, due to street gangs attempting 
to protect their territory and enhance market growth (usually for the supply of drugs). The 
involvement of children and young people as vulnerable gang members also raises issues 
surrounding criminal exploitation (Pitts, 2019), and therefore becomes a safeguarding concern 
requiring a proactive policing response. 
Violence, intimidation and coercion occurring at a more tactical level focuses on 
achieving short-term goals, such as encouraging legitimate businesses to part with money or 
provide a service (Wright, 2006). In some instances there is little need for tactical violence, 
and instead, the reputation of the organised criminal group is sufficient to coerce others to 
succumb to their demands and/or deter local citizens from providing valuable intelligence to 
the police (Crocker et al., 2017). As such, coercion in this respect may be viewed as an 
 7 
instrumental form of illegitimate power (Wright, 2006), and to some extent resembles the 
traditional characteristics of mafia-like organised crime. It is this power that also enables the 
more sophisticated organised criminal groups to become less visible as the ‘players’ at the top, 
whose reputation has established them as influential, instruct younger individuals to execute 
duties on their behalf. Areas where legitimate employment opportunities are rare become an 
attractive hunting ground for organised criminal groups to enlist vulnerable adults or young 
people. A case study of a London borough found that established organised criminals, 
commonly identified as older foreign nationals (usually over the age of 26 years; NCA, 2015) 
partaking in more serious crime for a sustained period of time (Francis, Humphreys, Kirby & 
Soothill, 2013), to have coerced local youths into conducting retail-level drug dealing activities, 
in some instances using intimidation to force them (Hales & Hobbs, 2010). 
Drug markets, such as those observed with county lines, are linked to a high prevalence 
of violence, or threat of violence, which is usually administered to enforce the payment of drug 
debts, disrupt local drug markets, sanction informants and resolve competition (Hesketh & 
Robinson, 2019; Lupton, Wilson, May, Warburton & Turnbull, 2002). This approach to 
business is known to circumvent further bouts of violence, often in retaliation; thus 
exacerbating the problem and causing significant damage to an area’s reputation. Whilst some 
residents may be too intimidated to report the occurrences, others may feel compelled to take 
action in an attempt to protect their community (Crocker et al., 2017; Lupton et al., 2002). 
However, the recruitment of local youths to facilitate the dealing of drugs works well here in 
diverting police attention from the activities of the key ‘players’ within the organised group 
(Stelfox, 1996). Local law enforcement may respond to smaller sub-elements of the 
organisation, depending on resource availability, and simply offer intelligence to the wider 
policing community which may not serve longer-term interests or tackle other elements of the 
criminal business. There may become an intense policing response to victims, which may 
require more resources, diverting further attention from the core crime business.  
Despite conflicting views (e.g. Sergi, 2015), this approach tentatively conveys a role 
for the hierarchical model within organised crime in England and Wales; although, networks 
seem to be dynamic and less formal (Levi, 2003) in comparison to those associated with more 
traditional mafia-type organisations. The pursuit of profit also continues to support the 
application of the entrepreneurial model. Indeed, the presence of overlapping hierarchical and 
entrepreneurial features suggest that the configuration of an organised criminal group is fluid, 
dependent on context and desired outcome. One would assume that this flexibility also allows 
for diversification when there is a need to evade police detection, form new alliances and extend 
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geographical scope (Galeotti, 2005). Pitts (2019) provides an example of the well organised 
Beaumont gang in Waltham Forest who were ‘going county’ (a reference to county lines), 
recruiting younger people via mobile communication to traffic and sell drugs in the South East 
and South West of England, and South Wales. They were also found ‘cuckooing’ homes (i.e. 
the use of violence and abuse to target the homes of others and use them as bases for drug 
dealing) belonging to vulnerable adults in Waltham Forest, turning them into ‘crack houses’. 
When police intervened, the gang diversified into the robbery of high value motor vehicles.  
Conceptually and operationally, organised crime is becoming more complex. The 
ability to diversify into a range of legitimate and illicit activities gives rise to challenges when 
establishing associated harms, in turn making it difficult to prioritise crimes and offenders 
(Kirby, 2013). In the ‘absence of law’ (i.e. “the actual or perceived inability of the police to 
counter the threat posed”; Pitts, 2019, p. 69), individuals are becoming increasingly anxious 
and assume responsibility for managing risk themselves. This method of informal social control 
is known to result in an escalation of violence, and maintains a perceived lack of both protection 
and police legitimacy (Pitts, 2019; Wilson, 2012). However, authorities are attempting to 
combat this view, requesting that communities report suspicious activity; yet, those at most 
risk are arguably hard to reach and intelligence is often poor, thus limiting the effectiveness of 
detection at a local level (Crocker et al., 2017).  
In a recent study, Kirby, McManus and Boulton (2018) emphasised the challenges of 
policing hostile environments. Individuals residing in areas associated with higher 
concentrations of organised criminal groups were found to perceive their neighbours as less 
likely to intervene in scenarios relevant to organised crime (e.g. drug dealing). However, there 
was subtle disparity between these areas, which suggests that communities interpret and 
respond to incidents in different ways and would therefore benefit from tailored community 
engagement programmes. Low levels of collective efficacy consistently reported by those 
living in areas where organised criminal groups proliferate was also a particular concern (Kirby 
et al., 2018), and interventions should arguably focus on improving resilience through fostering 
trust, social integration and motivation among residents. Consistent with the broken windows 
theory (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), communities that are able to work together and involve the 
police are likely to prevent low-level crime escalating into more serious forms. Indeed, with 
regards to organised crime, this level of severity has already been reached and instead there 
should be an emphasis on encouraging community support, where residents feel collectively 
able to provide intelligence without fear of retribution.        
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The complexities outlined so far arguably warrant further attention. The presence of 
organised criminal groups within local areas are noted to impinge on community confidence, 
and indeed, increase opportunities for impressionable youths to be drawn into abnormal 
patterns of criminality. Low levels of collective efficacy act as a barrier to disruption strategies, 
where a lack of informal community policing inhibits the sharing of information and 
perpetuates a culture that favours little contact with law enforcement. An innovative, tangible 
and urgent intervention is thus warranted that considers societal, cultural and environmental 
factors, and supports the development of more resilient and cooperative communities that 
proactively help to deter and disrupt organised crime. This moves the chapter on to explore the 
role of policing in organised crime, specifically in terms of ‘disruption’.      
 
Policing organised crime: A shift towards disruption 
 Defining organised crime is complex and resultantly gives rise to challenges for law-
enforcement when developing proactive strategies surrounding detection, disruption and 
investigation (Coyne & Bell, 2011). It is their inherent flexibility that provides organised 
criminal groups the ability to identify risks and opportunities for exploitation at a pace that 
exceeds law enforcement response. The processing of criminal technology, recording of 
witness statements, interviewing of suspects, obtaining of any necessary expert testimony, all 
add to the complexity of policing organised criminality. This has led to agencies having to 
consider alternative policing approaches to tackle this growing national and international 
concern. With some law enforcement agencies preferring surveillance, remote technology, and 
the use of informants to enable them substantial intelligence and evidential material. These 
resources are more complex to administer, offer higher risk, and can be politically sensitive.  
    At present, particularly at a local level, the response to organised crime in England 
and Wales is governed by the police and their partners. Although not a strict requirement, it is 
recommended that individual police forces, of which there are 44 in England and Wales, 
including the British Transport Police, produce profiles of organised crime within their 
geographical jurisdiction and develop a plan based on CONTEST (i.e. Pursue, Protect, Prevent 
and Prepare), the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy (Crocker et al., 2017). Policing organised 
crime in this manner conveys it as a national security threat similar to that of terrorism. Whilst 
organised crime and terrorism have distinctly different characteristics and motives, they are 
both sociologically classified as specific forms of group crime (Zubrzycki, 2015), and as such, 
applying a counter-terrorism initiative may aid interventions in dealing with organised crime, 
specifically when aiming to reduce harm. Kirby (2013) indicates that prevention is central to 
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the policing of terrorism and the investigative process therefore revolves around the ability to 
understand who the terrorists are and how they function within and as a group. He further notes 
that there are several means of preventing terrorist incidents, which include the arrest or 
deportation of the offender and target hardening (i.e. increasing the difficulty to execute an act 
of terrorism through removing facilitating mechanisms, such as funding and personal contacts). 
In applying this approach to organised crime, Kirby (2013) conveys the importance of first 
understanding the parts forming the criminal process and then using this information to prevent 
it from happening by disrupting criminal networks and plans. 
Thus, disruption and prevention appear to be key concepts when tackling organised 
crime. Although prevention focuses on the crime itself and explores methods of removing the 
opportunity for this to occur, it is disruption that takes action to manage the risks that stem 
from the social domain (Wright, 2006); that is, the offender’s network, lifestyle and routine, 
which are all important for the growth of the organised criminal group. Disruption has been 
described as a “more flexible, transitory and dynamic tactic that can be used more generally to 
make the environment hostile for the organised crime” (Kirby, 2013, p. 160), and concentrates 
predominantly on the offender. Yet, as highlighted, organised criminal groups consist of 
members with varying seniority and capability; all of whom collectively exhibit a range of 
legitimate and illegitimate activities. Certain members of the criminal group may be more 
visible than others, which provides an additional obstacle to overcome. Consider the Beaumont 
gang for instance, the more established members are likely to be hidden and protected whilst 
the younger recruits are exposed, trafficking and selling drugs at street-level. These extra layers 
enhance the complexity of the response required, and consequently, a tailored intervention is 
warranted that considers offence type(s), offender characteristics and the context within which 
crimes are being committed (Kirby & Snow, 2016).      
According to Bright and colleagues (2017), law enforcement strategies may be able to 
disrupt and dismantle organised criminal networks by attending to social (i.e. connections 
between key members in the group) and human capital (i.e. key members with specific 
attributes or skills that facilitate the group’s goals). Strategies which endeavour to remove key 
members with high social capital aim to fragment the organised network. The removal of 
members with high human capital, however, targets functioning (e.g. the illicit production of 
substances; Robins, 2009). Disruption strategies that focus on social and human capital have 
been found to be more effective than opportunistic law enforcement methods, such as ‘stop and 
search’ (Bright et al., 2017). It is the latter, nevertheless, that may prove useful for targeting 
recruits working at street-level.  
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Interventions that focus on more integral members of an organised criminal group are 
likely to encounter challenges relating to network characteristics. To overcome these, Duxbury 
and Haynie (2019) emphasise the importance of recognising criminal network resilience when 
developing disruption strategies. They state that organised groups who prioritise security and 
limit their visibility through minimising connections are likely to be more robust to disruption 
than groups who are more efficient, involving highly connected members responsible for 
relaying tasks and information. It is the security-orientated networks, however, that take longer 
to recover following disruption due to the smaller pool of eligible replacements (Duxbury & 
Haynie, 2019). Following disruption, organised criminal networks are likely to reflect on 
vulnerabilities and reshape their structure to prevent further damage (Morselli, 2009). 
Interventions should therefore be flexible in their approach whilst also being aligned to the type 
of criminal network. Intelligence becomes crucial when tailoring such interventions, as does 
obtaining information from those who have disengaged from involvement in organised crime 
(Douglas & Smith, 2018).  
As noted, knowledge obtained through intelligence-led approaches, can be used to 
develop and inform disruption strategies. Through intelligence, the NCA for example, is able 
to make an assessment of threat that can then be used to inform policing strategies more locally 
(Sergi, 2015). However, this so-called “golden-thread” of policing (Home Office, 2010, p. 23) 
has received considerable criticism, with law enforcement agencies accused of focusing on 
what is already known, using recorded and investigated criminal activity to subsequently 
predict what is not known (Ratcliffe, 2008). There is a demand to move away from this 
predictive methodology to gathering intelligence that is anticipative and accounts for broader 
factors, such as environment and type of criminal network, which are central to understanding 
how organised criminal groups operate (Coyne & Bell, 2011). Reverting back to the onus on 
the offenders themselves, Verfaillie and Beken (2008) reflect on the importance of detecting 
rather than targeting, identifying opportunities from the criminal perspective so as to allow for 
new intelligence to be obtained. Revisiting the Protect and Prevent strands of the UK counter-
terrorism strategy may assist with this, extending covert and overt surveillance to also include 
the monitoring of vulnerable groups who are deemed at risk of being recruited by organised 
criminal networks (Crocker et al., 2017). Focusing solely on historic information is likely to 
limit disruption strategies by solely attending to known suspects and old ways of working, 
neglecting the notion of organised criminal activity as an evolving and resilient construct, and 
indeed, the harm suffered by communities and businesses through which groups operate (Innes 
& Sheptycki, 2004).  
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 Intelligence-led disruption strategies place significant emphasis on joint working, 
where there is an expectation that law enforcement agencies share information to aid the 
detection of organised crime. However for this to be effective, Crocker et al. (2017) call for 
clearer guidance on individual roles and responsibilities to avoid confusion or overlap across 
agencies when collecting information, which has historically proven difficult to implement 
(Leong, 2007). Rather, there was a preference for an enforcement-orientated approach whereby 
organised criminals were prosecuted. Whilst this method is still used today, it tends to only be 
implemented for lower level offences (e.g. Kirby & Snow, 2016), simply due to the estimated 
number of active offenders being far greater than those facing prosecution at any one time. It 
has therefore been deemed an inefficient and unsustainable use of police resources, especially 
as many organised criminals will continue to operate and exploit others whilst in prison.  
  As such, there has been a shift from prosecution to the reduction of organised crime, 
with disruption strategies becoming central to this. There are an increasing number of proposals 
conveying disruption as an effective intervention for tackling organised crime, yet few have 
received empirical attention (Kirby & Nailer, 2013). Rather, it would appear that such 
suggestions are based on ‘gut instinct’ or anecdotal evidence. Kirby and Snow (2016), 
however, sought to systematically analyse organised crime disruption and investigated the 
manner in which English police forces tackled 15 organised criminal groups, which comprised 
a total of 99 individuals. One hundred and sixty-one interventions were identified, ranging from 
one to twenty-nine for each organised criminal group. For analysis purposes, Kirby and Snow 
(2016) categorised the interventions into five broad themes, which were as follows: 1). Policing 
behaviours; 2). Specific investigative activity (e.g. search warrants); 3). The use of the Criminal 
Justice System (e.g. prosecution of low level offending); 4). The control of assets (e.g. the 
repossession of property); and 5). Activity that controls or modifies the behaviour of the 
suspect. 
 In this instance, ‘policing behaviours’ refer to activities that explicitly make suspects 
aware that they are being targeted. Despite fear of inducing displacement (i.e. crime directed 
from one target to another, or to a new location, due to the removal of an opportunity for crime 
or seeking to prevent it; Clarke, 2012), similar deterrence strategies have been adopted in the 
United States (US) with promising results (e.g. Braga, Weisburd & Turchan, 2018). Legal 
options for prevention also exist with the creation of preventative orders such as the Slavery 
and Trafficking Risk Orders (STRO, Pt 2 The Modern Slavery Act 2015) designed to create 
criminal sanctions based on cumulative evidence and perceived risk. Based on rational choice 
theory, which posits that crime is likely to be prevented when offenders perceive costs to 
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outweigh the benefits (Cornish & Clarke, 1986), focussed deterrence strategies adopt a multi-
agency approach to communicate incentives and disincentives to targeted gang members 
(Kennedy, 2008) whilst also enhancing procedural justice and police legitimacy. Explicit 
messages are conveyed directly to gangs, informing them that any use of violence will be met 
with a rapid and severe policing response (Braga & Weisburd, 2012). At the same time, an 
emphasis is also placed on the benefits of non-violent behaviour to encourage a change in 
offender perception. 
 This approach alone is unlikely to disrupt organised crime as group members may 
purposely reduce their criminal activity during active interventions to avoid detection 
(especially those networks who are conscious of security). Other proactive crime prevention 
mechanisms are therefore expected to be at play to assist with this process. Yet, the diverse 
array of disruption techniques highlighted by Kirby and Snow (2016) arguably go some way 
to tackle organised crime as a heterogenous construct and block opportunities to sustain illicit 
activities across contexts; thus, increasing the perceived cost of committing crime. It is 
important at this stage to also recognise that police agencies operating at a local, national or 
international level have varying levels of resources, and as such, their response to organised 
crime is determined by both capacity and capability. Identifying the most appropriate 
disruption strategy would help with resource allocation, but research in this area remains 
limited due to methodological and ethical concerns; concerns that view the disruption process 
as intrusive and manipulative, and difficult to evaluate due to a lack of predetermined outcome 
variables. This section therefore concludes with a recommendation that academics and 
practitioners work together to consider an alternative means of ethically determining the 
effectiveness of specific disruption strategies when tackling organised crime.    
 
Conclusion 
  Organised crime as a theoretical and operational entity is becoming more complex and 
thus requires a policing response that focuses on organised networks at varying levels and 
across contexts. There needs to be an emphasis on intelligence-led approaches that predict 
developments in organised crime rather than relying on known information as a means of 
detection. Proactively identifying those vulnerable to exploitation may prove valuable in 
disrupting gang-related enterprises in England and Wales, with a partnership approach between 
law enforcement and community agencies further strengthening this. A range of disruption 
strategies have been found to be useful in deterring organised crime, and indeed violence and 
intimidation, beyond resource-intensive enforcement methods. However, further empirical 
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investigation is required to more effectively align disruption strategies with organised crime, 
and in doing so, tailoring interventions to account for varying offender characteristics, offence 
types, and the context within which organised networks are functioning.   
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